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Professor Sunder’s intriguing paper demonstrates the continuing power of
the related ideas of environmentalism and the public domain, but it also
identifies some of the hazards of those metaphors. I have only two unrelated
thoughts to add to her analysis.
First, I was struck by the parallels between her argument and the
historiography involving the displacement by British colonists of Native
Americans. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the “Indians” of North
America were commonly depicted as noble savages, living on but not altering
their natural environment. This imagery underlay the most common moral
justification for their displacement by Europeans: they weren’t productive. In
the words of Chief Justice Marshall, “[t]o leave them in possession of their
country, was to leave the country a wilderness.”1
Until recently, the main line of criticism of this vision and associated moral
argument combined two related themes: first, it devalued the Indians’
nonacquisitive, natural, respectful way of living lightly upon the land while
conserving it; and second, it fostered imperialism and unjust conquest. In his
pioneering book, Changes in the Land, William Cronon introduced an entirely
different line of criticism.2 The problem with the traditional account, he argued,
is not merely that it prioritized aggressive, transformative uses of the land over
conservation and harmony, but that it got the facts wrong. New England in
particular, when the British arrived, was not a primeval wilderness, “a climax
forest in permanent stasis,” respected and preserved by its sparse human
inhabitants. It was instead cultivated and occupied, an enormous garden or
pasture. Of the many ways that it had been modified by the Indians to suit their
own ends, one of the most important was the removal of the underbrush. Early
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British colonists remarked that one could ride a horse at a gallop through the
forests. As anyone who has strayed recently from a hiking trail in New England
can attest, the forest in its natural state is far denser. The openness of the
seventeenth century had been deliberately produced by the Indians, specifically
by periodically burning out the brush, to allow deer and other game to graze
more effectively, and to enable the Indians more effectively to hunt them.3
Acceptance of Cronon’s revisionist narrative requires reconsideration of our
conception of the injustice of the conquest and ouster of the Native Americans.
It was not the displacement of passive conservationists, by active, productive,
rapacious people. It was the displacement of a civilization that rested upon one
form of productivity and cultivation by a civilization that rested upon another
form.
Professor Sunder’s criticism of the traditional conception of traditional
knowledge takes the same form and deserves to be similarly influential. The
kinds of knowledge we describe, dangerously, as “traditional”—she
demonstrates—are no more passive, raw, stable, or unproductive than the
manner in which the Indians interacted with their physical environment. In
crafting legal regimes that will handle knowledge like this with fairness, we need
to recognize and accommodate its dynamic, active character.
Second, reading Professor Sunder’s paper has reinforced my sense that we
should be seeking, as a solution to this problem, not a harmonized global
intellectual-property regime, in which creators of “traditional knowledge”
obtain rights whose contours are determined by national laws, the content of
which are largely dictated by multilateral treaties, but a more complex and
variegated system of norms. Suppose that we added the following three parallel
provisions to the TRIPS Agreement:
(a) It shall be a defense to a claim of patent infringement that the
inventor(s), in developing the protected product or process, relied
substantially upon materials or knowledge taken from a member
country in violation of that country’s laws.4
(b) It shall be a defense to a claim of trademark infringement that the
trademark holder, or the original developer of the mark, relied
substantially upon materials or knowledge taken from a member
country in violation of that country’s laws.
(c) It shall be a defense to a claim of copyright infringement that the
work in which copyright is claimed constitutes a reproduction of a
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work registered within a member country, and that reproduction is
not authorized by a license from the country in question.
The effect of this reform would be to increase the leverage of countries in
determining the terms on which flora, fauna, medicinal knowledge, folklore,
and traditional art forms are exploited by others. Many countries already have
“natural resources” and folklore-protection laws that deal with such matters,
but those laws rarely figure significantly in the debate about traditional
knowledge (broadly construed) because it is so easy to violate them with
impunity. Adding the three provisions set forth above to the TRIPS Agreement
would give the local laws teeth, not by penalizing violations directly, but by
exposing violators to the economically devastating sanction of the forfeiture of
their own intellectual-property rights.
The countries in which traditional knowledge is currently concentrated
could be expected to exercise their enhanced powers in various ways. Some
would likely demand greater compensation from individuals and firms using
their materials. Others would insist upon attribution. Still others would insist
that the production of goods (drugs, clothing, et cetera) based upon traditional
knowledge be done in the country where that knowledge originated. Finally,
some would forbid the use of traditional knowledge altogether. Some of these
responses likely would prove more effective than others, and we would then
witness additional rounds of legal reform.
To be sure, implementation of this proposal would not be simple. Securing
the necessary modifications of the TRIPS Agreement would be very difficult.
Once that hurdle had been surmounted, and the laws of the member countries
of the WTO had been modified accordingly, we would expect to see
considerable litigation over what constituted “substantial reliance” within the
meaning of any of the three provisions. A fair amount of time and money would
be spent sorting things out.
Nor would the proposal solve all problems associated with traditional
knowledge. In particular, it would do nothing to ensure that indigenous groups
within developing countries got their fair share of the increased revenue that
flowed to (or through) their national governments. But addressing that serious
concern cannot be achieved through reforms engineered on the international
level. Debate and struggle within each country are necessary if each group is to
get its due.
In sum, the proposal is neither perfect nor comprehensive. But it seems
more promising that any of the alternative approaches to traditional knowledge
currently on the table.

